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INTRODUCTION
This celebration of the work of Michael Perry is a strong reminder of the
importance of human rights in our world today. Perry’s most recent book calls
human rights the central norms of “political morality.”1 For Perry, a political
morality is a set of norms governing how governments should and should not
act toward those over whom they exercise power.2 Human rights, therefore, set
a wide political agenda. This agenda is further expanded when Perry states that
human rights are the norms of the first truly global political morality in human
history.3 The need for such a global moral vision is increasingly evident in the
pressures shaping global politics today: interstate war between powers armed
with nuclear weapons, rising ethnic and religious conflicts both within and
across national borders, record levels of forced migration, growing nationalism,
and global economic inequality. To address issues like these in a normative way,

*
Pedro Arrupe Distinguished Research Professor in the Walsh School of Foreign Service and Senior
Fellow at the Berkley Center for Religion, Peace and World Affairs, Georgetown University. Prepared for a
Festschrift in Honor of Michael J. Perry.
1
MICHAEL J. PERRY, A GLOBAL POLITICAL MORALITY: HUMAN RIGHTS, DEMOCRACY, AND
CONSTITUTIONALISM 7 (2017).
2
Id.
3
Id.
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we need the kind of transnational and transcultural moral vision that Perry
maintains human rights provide.
This Essay will argue that human rights can in fact help shape the global
order in a morally desirable way. It will respond to several recent criticisms that
have suggested that human rights are no longer useful as normative standards
for global interaction. Some of these critiques charge that human rights are built
on an excessively individualistic understanding of the human person. If this
charge is valid, human rights will be unsuitable guides for action in those
cultures outside the West that are shaped by more communitarian values, such
as the cultures of many societies in Asia and Africa. Other critics hold that this
alleged individualism means that work for human rights will undermine the
solidarity needed to respond to the economic inequality and poverty that mar the
world today. This Essay, however, will argue that the human rights ethic is not
individualistic. When understood in a way that adequately reflects the full range
of rights affirmed in the United Nations’ Universal Declaration of Human Rights
(UDHR),4 human rights norms support a social or relational understanding of
the human person. The UDHR implies that the dignity of the human person can
only be protected and enhanced through interaction with others and through
active participation in social life.5 Human dignity and social solidarity are
reciprocally related to each other. Human rights, therefore, are appropriate
normative standards for politics not only in the West but also in more
communitarian cultures outside the West. Human rights also require and support
the solidarity needed to address inequality and poverty.
This Essay will support Perry’s claim that human rights provide the global
political morality we need. Part I addresses recent criticisms of human rights as
excessively individualistic. Part II argues that the UDHR sees human rights as
rooted in human solidarity, not as individualistically based. Part III makes a
substantive argument for what can be called a relational understanding of human
rights. The Essay concludes that such an understanding of human rights can be
genuinely universal and address key issues that arise in today’s world where the
West and the global South are increasingly interdependent.
I.

RECENT CRITIQUES OF HUMAN RIGHTS AS INDIVIDUALISTIC

Criticisms of human rights as an inappropriate moral standard for global
interaction have been numerous in recent years. Some critics reject the claim

4
5

G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Dec. 10, 1948) [hereinafter UDHR].
See id. arts. 27–28.
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that the United Nations’ 1948 UDHR is a genuinely universal declaration.6
These critics often insist that human rights arose from the eighteenth-century
Western Enlightenment, which stressed individual freedom and autonomy.7 If
the human rights ethic grants priority to an individualistic understanding of
autonomy as the freedom to be left alone, a human rights-based ethic will not be
compatible with the communitarian values stressed by Confucian, African, or
Islamic traditions. Thus, human rights will be unsuitable normative guides for
public action in much of Asia, Africa, and Muslim-majority countries.
In the Confucian context, for example, the former Prime Minister of
Singapore, Lee Kuan Yew, proposed this kind of critique. For Lee Kuan Yew,
the Declaration’s view of the person implies that “everybody would be better off
if they were allowed to do their own thing.”8 This is in strong conflict with the
mutual support in community called for by the Confucian tradition. Lee argued
that human rights will not be suitable normative guides for public action in
societies shaped by Confucianism, such as China, Japan, Korea, and Vietnam.9
These nations recognize the need for limits on a person’s individual freedom if
community well-being is to be achieved. Their people cannot fully endorse the
human rights proclaimed in the UDHR. The UDHR, therefore, is not universally
normative, despite its title.
In an analogous way, some African thinkers have voiced suspicion of “rights
talk” as individualistic and un-African. For example, the Nigerian Chris
Mojekwu declared that “African concepts of human rights are very different
from those of western Europe. Communalism and communal right concepts are
fundamental to understanding African culture, politics, and society.”10 Mojekwu
warned against thinking that the period of Western colonial control has
eliminated the importance of communal support in African societies today.11
Indeed, the human rights ethic could lead to a new form of colonialism.
Stress on communal values is also prominent in the African Charter on
Human and Peoples’ Rights, adopted in 1981 by the Organization of African

6

Id.
See infra Part III.A (discussing Kant’s influence on Western philosophy and thought).
8
Fareed Zakaria & Lee Kuan Yew, Culture Is Destiny: A Conversation with Lee Kuan Yew, 73 FOREIGN
AFFS. 109, 112 (1994). But see LEE KUAN YEW, FROM THIRD WORLD TO FIRST: THE SINGAPORE STORY: 19652000, at 487–500 (2000) (suggesting that Lee Kuan Yew believed that East Asian societies may be evolving in
ways that will make them more culturally and socially receptive to human rights and democracy).
9
See Zakaria & Yew, supra note 8, at 113–14.
10
Chris C. Mojekwu, International Human Rights: The African Perspective, in INTERNATIONAL HUMAN
RIGHTS: CONTEMPORARY ISSUES 85, 92 (Jack L. Nelson & Vera M. Green eds., 1980).
11
Id. at 92–93.
7
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Unity in Banjul, Gambia.12 The African or Banjul Charter explicitly calls itself
a charter of “human and peoples’ rights.”13 It proclaims not only that all human
beings are equal but also that all peoples are equal.14 The peoples who form
cultural and national communities, as well as individual persons, have rights to
self-determination and economic, social, and cultural development.15 This
communal stress led the Banjul Charter to add a set of duties to the rights it
proclaims. These duties include the obligation of individuals to support their
national community by placing their physical and intellectual abilities at its
service and the obligation not to compromise the security of the state of which
one is a national or a resident.16 More recently, the suspicion of human rights as
allegedly Western has been evident in some objections to the International
Criminal Court’s efforts to enforce the most basic rights to be protected from
atrocities. For example, Mahmood Mamdani, a Ugandan of Indian ancestry, sees
the human rights agenda of the International Criminal Court as an effort to
reestablish Western colonial domination in Africa.17 Some post-modern, postcolonial thinkers in the West also see efforts to enforce human rights as a form
of neocolonialism.18
In addition to these cultural critiques of human rights, there has been a longstanding economic objection that human rights legitimate economic exploitation
because of their allegedly individualistic orientation. Karl Marx objected to
human rights for this reason, insisting that “none of the so-called rights of men
goes beyond the egoistic man, the man withdrawn into himself, his private
interest and his private choice, and separated from the community.”19 For Marx,
human rights give primacy to private or individualistic interests and thus readily
support the results of free-market capitalism. He saw human rights as ignoring
patterns of social relationship that are structured by economic institutions and
the harmful effects of many of these institutions.20 Marx therefore insisted that
12
African Charter on Human and People’s Rights, in THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN
AFRICA pmbl., arts. 19–22 (M. Hamalengwa et al. eds., 1988).
13
Id. pmbl. (emphasis added).
14
Id. arts. 3, 19.
15
Id. arts. 19–22.
16
Id. art. 29.
17
See Mahmood Mamdani, Responsibility to Protect or Right to Punish?, 4 J. INTERVENTION &
STATEBUILDING 53, 55–57 (2010).
18
See MICHAEL IGNATIEFF ET AL., HUMAN RIGHTS AS POLITICS AND IDOLATRY 58–77 (Amy Gutmann &
Stephen Macedo eds., 2001) (critiquing human rights as excessively Western); see also DAVID HOLLENBACH,
THE GLOBAL FACE OF PUBLIC FAITH: POLITICS, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND CHRISTIAN ETHICS 218–58 (2003)
(discussing other aspects of these Confucian, African, and post-modern critiques).
19
KARL MARX, ON THE JEWISH QUESTION (1844), reprinted in WRITINGS OF THE YOUNG MARX ON
PHILOSOPHY AND SOCIETY 216, 236–37 (D. Easton & Kurt H. Guddat eds., 1967).
20
Id. at 237–38.
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human emancipation go beyond political emancipation to economic
emancipation.21 He wrote that “right can never be higher than the economic
structure of society and its cultural development thereby determined.”22 A
human rights ethic that gives primacy to civil and political freedom will not
challenge the economic inequalities that divide society into classes. Such an
approach will leave social divisions in place and end up supporting both
oppression and poverty.
Samuel Moyn’s more recent argument that human rights are “not enough”
to address the inequalities that lead to massive human suffering today echoes
this Marxist critique.23 Moyn does not endorse a Marxist approach explicitly. He
does, however, make his commitment to socialism quite clear. For a generation,
Moyn says, we have thought that “human rights are the essential bulwark against
atrocity and misrule.”24 But the economic inequalities of today’s world show us
that the challenge is to make “the older and grander choice between socialism or
barbarism.”25 If this choice is made rightly, then it will make socialism “the
global project it has rarely been but must become.”26
Moyn argues that the human rights movement has gone in the opposite
direction from the socialist approach he favors. It has become far too closely
associated with “neo-liberal” strategies for economic development. Such
strategies stress economic liberty and insist on minimal state control of
markets.27 Neo-liberals see free markets as engines of economic growth and
maintain that when growth takes place it will trickle down to those at the bottom
of society and alleviate their poverty.28 Moyn insists, however, that such growth
rarely benefits the poor.29 It usually ends up in the wallets of those at the top of
the economic ladder, contributing to economic inequality.30 Failure to recognize
the harmful effects of this inequality is due to a sort of market fundamentalism.31
Moyn relies on a reading of recent history to back up his claim that the
human rights movement has become destructively allied with a harmful neoliberal development strategy. In his view, the contemporary human rights
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31

Id. at 238–39.
KARL MARX, CRITIQUE OF THE GOTHA PROGRAM 26 (Wildside Press 2008) (1891).
SAMUEL MOYN, NOT ENOUGH: HUMAN RIGHTS IN AN UNEQUAL WORLD 220 (2018).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 174.
Id.
Id. at 126–27.
Id.
Id. at 8, 172.
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movement took shape in the mid-1970s, when the Helsinki Accords led to
significant Western pressure on the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact countries to
support human rights by reducing state control on both political and economic
life.32 Moyn is correct when he argues that the Helsinki Accords led to a
significant growth in the human rights movement.33 This is evident, for example,
from the fact that one of today’s most important human rights organizations,
Human Rights Watch, began in 1978 under the name Helsinki Watch.34 Its goal
was to monitor rights abuses in countries behind the Iron Curtain that had signed
the Helsinki Accords, for the Accords included explicit commitment to respect
human rights within the Soviet bloc.35 The human rights efforts of the mid1970s, therefore, had significant anti-totalitarian and anti-authoritarian
emphases, especially in Europe.36 Moyn draws on this history to support his
claim that the human rights movement is primarily concerned with political
repression by authoritarian regimes but uninterested in the harmful effects of
economic equality.37 Thus, he thinks that the human rights movement has
developed in a way that leads it to “abet” the inequality brought by capitalism.38
Efforts to advance human well-being should therefore turn away from the human
rights approach to one based on the promise of social justice that has long been
part of a socialist commitment. Such commitment will provide an effective
alternative to the individualistic neo-liberalism that supports unjust economic
inequality.
There have been notable replies to the claims that human rights are too
individualistic to be relevant to communitarian cultures outside the West and too
supportive of market freedom to resist today’s inequalities. For example, on the
cultural level, Kim Dae Jung—the South Korean human rights activist who
became President of his country—vigorously rejects the claim that the human
rights ethos is incompatible with Asian cultures.39 Kim cites the duty of
Confucian scholars to resist erring monarchs as an Asian precedent for
democratic procedure that antedates modern democracy in the West.40 Amartya
Sen, who is originally from India, makes similar claims that support for human

32

SAMUEL MOYN, THE LAST UTOPIA: HUMAN RIGHTS IN HISTORY 163–64 (2010).
See id.
34
See About Us, HUM. RTS. WATCH, https://www.hrw.org/about/about-us# (last visited May 1, 2022).
35
Id.
36
MOYN, supra note 32, at 222.
37
See id. at 225.
38
MOYN, supra note 23, at 216.
39
Kim Dae Jung, Is Culture Destiny? The Myth of Asia’s Anti-Democratic Values, 73 FOREIGN AFFS.
189, 194 (1994).
40
Id.
33
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rights can be found in both Indian and Chinese religious and cultural traditions.41
In the African context, the Beninois philosopher Paulin Hountondji has defended
the importance of human rights in resistance to oppression by African
governments that have become authoritarian or corrupt.42 The Nigerian Nobel
laureate novelist Wole Soyinka called human rights the most important idea of
the millennium that ended in the year 2000, especially in the face of the kind of
oppression that exiled him from his homeland.43 On the economic level, a
distinguished historian of the drafting of the UDHR, Johannes Morsink, has
shown that the rights to economic necessities in the UDHR have a status that is
just as demanding as the rights to political freedom.44 He holds that human rights
are not individualistic norms but that they are suitable both in communitarian
cultures and to address today’s economic inequalities.45
What follows in this Essay will offer further response to the objection that
human rights are excessively individualistic. Part II will show that the UDHR
sees support for human rights as an expression of solidarity among persons. Part
III will build on the text of the UDHR and argue in a more substantive way that
rights are best understood as grounded in a deeply social or relational
understanding of the human person.
II. RIGHTS AND SOLIDARITY IN THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION
The UDHR supports interpreting human rights and social solidarity as
closely interconnected. The text of the UDHR itself emphasizes the importance
of human interdependence and solidarity for the protection of human dignity.46
The UDHR sees human personhood as embedded in social life and as requiring
social solidarity. Thus, we will argue, the understanding of human rights in the
UDHR is not individualistic.

41

AMARTYA SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM 227–48 (1999).
Paulin J. Hountondji, The Master’s Voice: Remarks on the Problem of Human Rights in Africa, in
PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS 319, 328–29 (Alwin Diemer et al. eds., 1986).
43
Wole Soyinka, Best Idea: Every Dictator’s Nightmare, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Apr. 1999), https://archive.
nytimes.com/www.nytimes.com/library/magazine/millennium/m1/soyinka.html; Wole Soyinka: Biographical,
THE NOBEL PRIZE, https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/literature/1986/soyinka/biographical/ (last visited May 1,
2022).
44
See JOHANNES MORSINK, THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS: ORIGINS, DRAFTING,
AND INTENT 222–32 (1999) [hereinafter MORSINK, THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS];
JOHANNES MORSINK, INHERENT HUMAN RIGHTS: PHILOSOPHICAL ROOTS OF THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION
235–52 (2009) [hereinafter MORSINK, INHERENT HUMAN RIGHTS].
45
MORSINK, THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 44, at 139.
46
UDHR, supra note 4.
42
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To be sure, the UDHR includes the right not to be subjected to acts that
“outrage the conscience of mankind,” such as the Nazi genocide against the
Jews,47 and the freedoms that were central to the anti-totalitarian, antiCommunist impulses of the human rights advocates who supported the Helsinki
Accords in the mid-1970s.48 If the UDHR were limited to these rights, a case
might plausibly be made that it sees rights principally as immunities from
interference by other persons with one’s personal security and freedom—in
other words, as rights of individual persons to be left alone. But the UDHR
clearly goes beyond these immunities when it affirms social, economic, and
cultural rights in Articles 22 through 27. These social and economic rights
include the rights to employment, an adequate standard of living for oneself and
one’s family (food, clothing, housing, medical care, etc.), education, and
security in the event of unemployment, sickness, or old age.49 Securing these
rights will often require positive action by others, including the government. The
need for such action is the reason social and economic rights are often called
positive rights. Protecting them requires one to be actively committed to one’s
fellow citizens in a way that positively supports their economic and social wellbeing. How much commitment to the well-being of others can reasonably be
expected is surely debatable. However, the UDHR insists that everyone has a
right at least to the “food, clothing, housing[,] . . . medical care,” and education
needed for her well-being and that of her family.50 Thus, the Declaration’s
affirmation of social and economic rights requires active support for at least a
basic level of well-being for one’s fellow citizens. Such support will itself
require positive and reciprocal relationships among citizens and depend on the
presence of a kind of social solidarity that is far from the individualistic spirit
some critics argue the UDHR presupposes.
It is precisely the fact that social and economic rights require a minimal level
of solidarity that leads some to declare that they are not genuine human rights at
all.51 Such critics argue that rights require not interfering with other people’s
activities by just leaving them alone. Civil and political rights are often seen this
47
Id. pmbl. Moyn maintains that the historical account that the atrocities of the Holocaust stimulated the
movement of human rights to the forefront of recent moral awareness “might be the most universally repeated
myth about their origins.” See MOYN, supra note 32, at 6. This is far from a myth, as has been shown by the
careful historical studies of Johannes Morsink. See JOHANNES MORSINK, T HE U NIVERSAL D ECLARATION OF
H UMAN R IGHTS AND THE H OLOCAUST 9 (2019).
48
See supra notes 34–36 and accompanying text.
49
UDHR, supra note 4, arts. 22–27.
50
Id. art. 25.
51
See MAURICE CRANSTON, WHAT ARE HUMAN RIGHTS? 66–68 (1973); Maurice Cranston, Human
Rights, Real and Supposed, in POLITICAL THEORY AND THE RIGHTS OF MAN 1, 43–51 (D.D. Raphael ed., 1967)
[hereinafter Cranston, Human Rights].
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way. The right to free speech means no one may legitimately prevent another
from communicating what they think by destroying their printing press or
shutting down their radio station. For this reason, civil and political rights are
often called negative rights. They are like fences or walls that protect one against
harm or interference that others might inflict. Social and economic rights are
called positive rights because their implementation requires positive action.
These civil and political rights are often thought to be easier to protect than rights
to food and health care. Thus, some see civil political rights as genuine rights,
while they regard social and economic rights as ideals.52
This sharp distinction, however, overlooks the need for the larger society to
take significant, positive steps to protect the civil and political rights of its
citizens in an effective way. A verbal guarantee of freedom of speech in a
country’s constitution will not have real meaning unless the country has created
legal and political institutions to prevent others, including the state, from
interfering with people’s ability to communicate with others as they wish. The
effective protection of freedom of speech, religion, and assembly requires
creating an effective judicial system and other social means to enforce the
constitutional guarantee of these rights. As Henry Shue put it, “the protection of
‘negative rights’ requires positive measures.”53 Civil and political rights,
therefore, depend on positive social action, institution-building, and
expenditures that go well beyond just leaving one’s fellow citizens alone.54 It
requires both respect for one’s fellow citizens and a commitment to their wellbeing. Both civil and political rights and social and economic rights require a
form of commitment to others in positive relationships.
The text of the UDHR, therefore, shows that the drafters were aware that the
protection of both forms of rights will require a measure of social solidarity.
Article 1 recognizes this, proclaiming that “[a]ll human beings are born free and
equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience and should
act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood.”55 Here, the UDHR implies that
“a spirit of brotherhood” will be essential to securing human rights for all human
beings. Today, our awareness of the importance of gender-inclusive language
suggests that the intent of Article 1 would be better expressed by stating that persons
should act toward one another with a “spirit of solidarity.” Indeed, the Oxford English
Dictionary tells us that the meanings of “brotherhood” include “care,”

52
53
54
55

Cranston, Human Rights, supra note 51, at 1.
HENRY SHUE, BASIC RIGHTS: SUBSISTENCE, AFFLUENCE, AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY 39 (2d ed. 1996).
See id.
UDHR, supra note 4, art. 1.
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“comradeship,” and “solidarity.”56 Solidarity, of course, is the antithesis of the
individualistic spirit that leads some to see the human rights ethic as unsuited to
the communitarian cultures of Asia and Africa and as unable to challenge the
economic inequalities of today’s world. The text of the UDHR does not support
this kind of individualistic interpretation of human rights. It implies that
fraternity, sorority, solidarity, and support for others through mutual relationship
will be required by the ethic it proposes.
Though the text of the UDHR clearly implies that effective protection of
rights will require a degree of social solidarity, the drafters went out of their way
to avoid endorsing any specific philosophical theory of human rights. They did
not endorse a theoretical rationale, either individualist or communitarian, for
what they produced. For example, René Cassin, who played a key role in
creating the UDHR, wrote that the drafting committee sought “to take no
position on the nature of man and of society and to avoid metaphysical
controversies.”57 The drafters were deeply aware that diverse ideological,
cultural, and religious traditions would be unable to reach agreement if they
sought to deduce human rights from a philosophical understanding of human
nature or from ultimate religious beliefs about God and the world. The
philosopher Jacques Maritain advised the drafting committee to avoid endorsing
any comprehensive vision of the good life since this would prevent agreement
on human rights.58 He recognized that if human rights were grounded in Western
enlightenment liberalism, then representatives of the Soviet Union could not
support them, and if they were grounded in Marxist social thought, then Western
democrats would not support them, dooming the human rights project from the
start.59 Nevertheless, Maritain believed that there was a route to consensus.
Some basic agreement across differences could be found by relying on practical
reflection on human experience. In this vein, Maritain quipped that the drafters
could reach agreement “but on condition that no one asks us why.”60 By drawing
on shared common experiences, Western liberals, Soviet socialists, Confucians,
Muslims, and nonbelievers could reach agreement that some forms of human
behavior whose harmful effects they have all witnessed, such as genocide,
56
See Brotherhood, OXFORD ENG. DICTIONARY, https://www.oed.com/view/Entry/23803?redirected
From=brotherhood (last visited Jan. 21, 2022).
57
See MORSINK, T HE U NIVERSAL D ECLARATION OF H UMAN R IGHTS , supra note 44, at 287 (quoting
René Cassin, Historique de la Déclaration Universelle de 1948, in LA PENSÉE ET L’ACTION 108 (1972)); see
also PAUL GORDON LAUREN, THE EVOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS: VISIONS SEEN 219–25 (3d
ed. 2011) (providing a summary of some of the philosophical disputes that arose in drafting the UDHR).
58
Jacques Maritain, Introduction, in HUMAN RIGHTS: COMMENTS AND INTERPRETATIONS, at i, ix (U.N.
Educ. Sci. & Cultural Org. ed., 1948).
59
Id. at viii.
60
Id.
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should never be permitted to happen again. Shared experience could also show
those from very different traditions that some goods, such as freedom of belief
and thought, adequate nutrition, health care, and work, should be provided to all
persons when possible.
Thus, the determination of what rights to include in the Declaration was an
inductive process, drawing on experiences of mistreatments of others and
failures to assist them. Morsink calls this a process of determining “rights from
wrongs.”61 The rights were identified inductively from concrete experiences of
human atrocities that all would morally reject and also from shared experience
of human needs that all saw should be met. Induction from experience of harms
to be avoided and needs to be met, rather than deduction from the philosophic
or ideological principles, led to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.62
The consensus across traditions and ideologies on the rights proclaimed in
the UDHR was certainly a major achievement. We should continue to recognize
its importance today, especially when conflict-generating differences often seem
to have the upper hand. Indeed, the World Conference on Human Rights, held
in Vienna in June 1993, recognized the continuing importance of agreement
across diverse cultures when it reaffirmed “the solemn commitment of all States
to fulfil [sic] their obligations to promote universal respect for, and observance
and protection of, all human rights and fundamental freedoms for all.”63 The
Conference stressed the continuing importance of agreement across traditions
when it proclaimed that “[t]he universal nature of these rights and freedoms is
beyond question.”64
III. TOWARD A RELATIONAL UNDERSTANDING OF RIGHTS
Despite this remarkable agreement across the major traditions of the world,
it is certainly possible that the distinctive normative visions contained within
these traditions continue to influence people’s approaches to human rights.

61
MORSINK, INHERENT HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 44, at 58. Morsink attributes this phrase to the
“snappy title” of Alan Dershowitz’s book, Rights from Wrongs: A Secular Theory of the Origins of Rights, in
which Dershowitz argues that we can learn what rights are from the wrongs we encounter. Id. (discussing ALAN
DERSHOWITZ, RIGHTS FROM WRONGS: A SECULAR THEORY OF THE ORIGINS OF RIGHTS (2005)). The phrase
“rights from wrongs” is also the title of a chapter in Cass R. Sunstein’s study of a “second bill of rights,” proposed
by U.S. President Franklin Roosevelt in 1944, which proclaimed what are now known as social and economic
rights. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE SECOND BILL OF RIGHTS 35–60 (2004).
62
See MORSINK, INHERENT HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 44, at 32, 58.
63
World Conf. on Hum. Rts., Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, para. 37, U.N. Doc.
A.CONF.157/23 (June 25, 1993), https://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/Vienna.aspx.
64
Id.

HOLLENBACH_6.22.22

1498

6/23/2022 12:34 PM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 71:1487

Richard McKeon, who served as rapporteur for the Committee of Experts,
convened by UNESCO to advise the drafting committee on more philosophical
issues, expected diverse traditions to continue to have influence in three ways:
the traditions could (1) shape the interpretation of human rights in the
Declaration in the face of pluralism; (2) lead to different readings of the context
within which human rights are pursued and the degree to which persons are seen
as social and interdependent; and (3) influence recommendations about how to
implement rights.65
A. Western Pluralism and Social Solidarity
Due to the continuing influence of differing cultures, religions, and
philosophies, it is not surprising that the interpretations of human rights
prevailing in the West today are often more individualistic than those seen as
desirable in non-Western communities. Nevertheless, there are diverse Western
understandings of the appropriate relationship between the individual person and
society. The Western tradition is, in fact, internally pluralistic on this issue.
There is not a single Western answer to the question of whether human rights
should be grounded in a more individualistic understanding of the person or on
one that sees human beings as embedded in social relationships. On the one
hand, if the interpretation of human rights is influenced by an individualistic
understanding of the person, then Asian, African, and other more communal
traditions are unlikely to conclude that human rights fit with their values, despite
the cross-cultural consensus reached by the UDHR drafting committee in 1948.
On the other hand, if an understanding of human rights is shaped by a view of
the human person that sees social solidarity as essential to the realization of
human dignity, then non-Western societies will be able to support human rights
without abandoning key aspects of their traditions. This will also increase the
possibility of genuinely universal support for human rights today. To address
these matters, we will have to consider some of the theoretical and philosophical
matters that the drafting committee sought to avoid. Despite the individualism
that sometimes prevails in the West, there are important strands in the Western
tradition that contain strongly social understandings of the human person.
Drawing on these strands will enable us to give a more theoretical or
philosophical grounding for the consensus on human rights reached by the
drafting committee.

65
Richard McKeon, The Philosophic Bases and Material Circumstances of the Rights of Man, in HUMAN
RIGHTS: COMMENTS AND INTERPRETATIONS 23, 24 (U.N. Educ. Sci. & Cultural Org. ed., 1949).
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Many disputes about human rights today, of course, are disputes about who
should exercise political power over whom and in what manner this power
should be used. Such disputes about power are often driven by the pursuit of the
self-interest of ruling persons or groups. Not all disagreements about human
rights, however, are driven by pursuit of power and self-interest. Some are
rooted in divergent theories of the relation between person and society. When
the disputes take this more theoretical form, the possibility of convergence
between the West and the communal traditions of the Confucian, Islamic, and
African worlds will contribute to the movement for human rights in an important
way. Thus, we will seek to show that the cross-cultural consensus on human
rights can be strengthened if those in the West draw upon strands of their own
tradition that see social solidarity and interhuman relationship as key dimensions
of human well-being. Human dignity can only be realized in community with
other persons. The advancement of human dignity and the protection of human
rights require inter-human solidarity and supportive social relationships. Human
rights, therefore, presume a relational understanding of the person.
The strand of the Western tradition most often associated with the emergence
of human rights in their contemporary form was developed by the eighteenthcentury Enlightenment thinkers. The political philosophy of the eighteenth
century in the West was, of course, immensely rich. Nevertheless, is it is not
misleading to see the work of Immanuel Kant as a crucial influence on the way
human dignity and human rights have been philosophically understood in the
West in recent centuries. For Kant, the fundamental standard of morality is that
all human beings ought to be treated with respect for their inherent dignity, as
ends in themselves and not only as means to be used for some other purpose.66
The dignity or worth of human persons is not like the price of things. The value of a
human being—the person’s dignity—is beyond price. Things with price can be
exchanged for each other in the marketplace. But humans, because of their
dignity, are valuable in themselves and thus cannot be simply traded one for
another.67 All human beings, therefore, should be treated with unconditional respect.
The response due to human dignity is respect for the inherent worth of the
person, not the kind of fairness that is involved in setting a just price for a
commodity being exchanged in the marketplace. In support of this stance, Kant
argued that the individual person’s capacity for autonomous free choice is the source
and prime characteristic of human dignity.68 In his words, “autonomy is the ground
66
IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDING FOR THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 36 (James W. Ellington trans., 3d
ed. 1993).
67
Id. at 40–41.
68
Id.
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of the dignity of human nature and of every rational nature.”69 Kant’s stress on
autonomy as the principal characteristic of dignity can easily lead to seeing dignity as
a characteristic of the person apart from the interconnections of social life. If taken
this way, Kant’s linkage of dignity with autonomy would easily validate the claims
of those who see human rights as individualistic and inappropriate for more
communal cultures, such as those that prevail in Asia and Africa.
Kant’s ethic, however, can also support positive commitment to social interaction
as essential to the protection of human dignity. For example, Kant formulated his
moral philosophy by setting forth the categorical imperative as its fundamental
principle.70 The categorical imperative not only calls for the protection of the
autonomy of persons as ends in themselves but it also requires that the norms which
guide one’s choices should be universally applicable to all in similar situations across
society.71 Also, Kant stressed that the persons who are to be treated as ends in
themselves should be seen not as isolated individuals but as members of what he
called a “kingdom of ends,”72 providing a notably social dimension.73 But my
purpose here is not to outline the relation between Kantian moral philosophy and
human rights in a systematic way. Rather, it is simply to highlight that if human
dignity is seen as grounded in capacity for autonomous free choice and understood
outside the social framework that Kant supports, then this will reduce and possibly
destroy the relevance of human rights for more communal cultures.
Indeed, there is empirical evidence that contemporary Western societies,
especially the United States, have adopted a strong commitment to individual
autonomy as their overriding moral concern and that they see autonomy as
unencumbered by the social support that Kant saw as essential.74 This is suggested
by Alan Wolfe’s study of the moral values that shape U.S. culture today. Wolfe
draws on both quantitative survey research and qualitative interviews of individuals
from very diverse sectors of U.S. social life.75 His data suggest that most Americans
today believe that “individuals should determine for themselves what it means to
lead a good and virtuous life.”76 Autonomy as freedom to make specific choices
and, more importantly, to decide on one’s own what values should shape the
69

Id. at 41.
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See id. at 42–43.
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overall direction of one’s life has become central to the moral orientation by
which most Americans shape their lives today. The autonomous freedom
shaping the moral culture of the United States does not give much attention to
the social commitments present in Kant’s ethic when it emphasizes autonomy as
its central value. Wolfe recognizes that this carries considerable dangers, but he
thinks it is not a bad thing overall and that it is likely irreversible.77
I share Wolfe’s concern that autonomous freedom can bring dangers.
However, I think he is too sanguine about our capacity to deal with these dangers
effectively within an individualistic ethic. We need to recognize the important
ways that freedom is rooted in social and communal relationships. If these
relationships are not present and adequately sustained, then autonomy is likely
to wither. Since freedom is a key dimension of human dignity, the commitment
to the dignity of persons must include a commitment to building and sustaining
the social relationships needed to support autonomy. Support for both the
autonomy of individuals and for the social and communal relationships needed
to sustain autonomy must go together.78 Both autonomy and relationship are
required to sustain the human rights ethos laid out in the UDHR. Indeed, an
understanding of human rights that both reflects the text of the UDHR and leads
to policies that protect people in an effective way must recognize how important
social relationships are for human dignity. In other words, human dignity and
human rights must be understood as embedded in the social interactions needed
to sustain dignity and protect rights. We need a relational understanding of
human rights.
B. The Social Person—Not Absent from Western Thought
The fact that humans can flourish only in relationships and social interaction
has long had an important place in the Western tradition. Aristotle, whose
thought was one of the central sources at the origin of Western ethical reflection,
recognized that human relationships are crucial aspects of human flourishing. In
his Politics, Aristotle described the human person as an essentially social or
political animal.79 In Aristotle’s Greek, the person is zoon politikon, an animal
of the polis or city-state.80 Life in the civic community is essential to “the good
life.” Active sharing in the relationships of society is necessary for one to live
well, not an accidental add-on. Indeed, Aristotle saw speech and the ability to
77

Id. at 202, 222, 229.
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communicate with others in public debate as key human characteristics.81
Through speech, humans can interact with each other actively and reciprocally.
Speech enables humans to dialogue with each other about how they should live
together and about what is just and unjust in their interactions.82 Thus, the human
relationships that speech makes possible bring the civic community into
existence. In the absence of such interactive relationships, the polis and political
life would not exist. Aristotle’s vision thus implies that exclusion from the social
interaction that creates the polis leads to a less than fully human life.
Of course, Aristotle’s willingness to accept that some human beings are
naturally destined to be slaves also indicates that he did not see all humans as
entitled to the full freedom that comes with citizenship. Today, we rightly reject
this aspect of his thought. But just as we can draw on Aristotle to provide a
corrective to the individualistic tendencies of Kant, we can draw on Kant to
overcome Aristotle’s inadequate approach to human equality. Kant insisted that
all human persons possess equal dignity as ends and deserve to be treated in a
way that takes account of their common humanity.83 Drawing on Aristotle, we
can add to Kant that respect for a person’s dignity requires that we recognize
and support her active participation in the social relationships of the polis. This
blending of Aristotle’s stress on the importance of social participation with
Kant’s commitment to equal dignity will lead us to see human dignity and
human rights in relational terms.
The relational aspects of human dignity are further clarified by Aristotle’s
observation that a person who is self-sufficient and has no need of social life
“must be either a beast or a god.”84 Being a beast or a sort of brute animal means
one lacks those capacities that mark beings with consciousness or spirit, such as
those that enable humans to know and to exercise freedom. Because they possess
these abilities, persons are not passive and inarticulate. Rather, they are capable
of the kind of self-transcendence that makes them valuable for their own sake.
Not being a beast or a thing is thus a marker of the distinctive worth of human
personhood. It indicates that persons live in a genuinely human way when they
are able to engage in activities of the spirit, such as growing in knowledge and
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exercising freedom. That humans are not beasts is also indicated by their
capacity to move beyond themselves by knowing other persons, appreciating the
dignity of others, and forming relationships of friendship and solidarity. The
self-transcendence by which one person respects the worth of another can also
be a reciprocal recognition of the value they share with each other together.
Human dignity is not realized inside a person alone or simply within the selfconsciousness of individuals. Rather, dignity is actualized and expressed when
persons encounter each other in active relationships and when they affirm and
support one another as fellow human beings. The capacity for self-transcendence
that is the source of human dignity, therefore, is a capacity for human
relationships built on mutual respect. Because humans are neither beasts nor
things, each person’s capacity for self-transcendence makes a claim on this
capacity in other persons.85 Persons actualize their human dignity, therefore, in
the relationships of a community bound together in mutual respect and moral
solidarity.
Aristotle also insisted that human beings are not gods.86 Unlike a god, who
might be imagined as unconstrained by the conditions of the concrete material
world, the human spirit is embodied. The human good is that of a bodily being
with material preconditions. Human dignity can only be realized if the material
conditions needed for bodily flourishing are present. In a perspective derived
from Aristotle, therefore, protecting humanity requires both securing a person’s
capacities for knowledge, freedom, and relationship and guaranteeing access to
food, shelter, medical care in sickness, as well as other needed material supports.
Not being a god also reinforces Aristotle’s insistence that humans are social
beings. Attaining necessary material goods requires interaction both with the
material world and with other persons. The material support needed for human
dignity will not be attainable if a person is cut off from social life. The bodily
requirements of human well-being, therefore, reinforce the claim that persons
are morally interdependent on one another. This moral relatedness means that
persons have legitimate claims on one another to collaborate in ways that make
it possible for them to share in the material goods and bodily activities required
for living with dignity. Human dignity thus implies the right (1) to have one’s
material needs met on at least a basic level, and (2) to have the social supports
that will make this possible.
We can briefly summarize this effort to synthesize some elements drawn
from Kant and Aristotle. One person’s ability to know and understand ought to
85
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be recognized and supported by other persons. One person’s freedom places
requirements on the freedom of others. One person’s material needs for food,
shelter, and medical care places requirements on how others share in these
resources. The requirement of human dignity in each of these areas of human
activity is made explicit as a human right. There are human rights in each of
these areas of human life: the capacity for knowledge, the achievement of
freedom, and the attainment of material conditions of well-being. Further, since
attaining dignity in each of these domains will require the support that comes
from active participation in the larger community, we can conclude that human
rights should guarantee the social relationships needed for this participation.
Human rights, therefore, are relational realities. They are rights to those
relationships with others in society that are needed to protect one’s dignity in the
diverse forms of interaction that constitute social life.
C. Jewish and Christian Traditions on the Person as Relational
The argument from secular philosophical sources that social relationships
are essential to the protection of human dignity and rights can be reinforced by
perspectives proposed in the Jewish and Christian traditions. Both Jews and
Christians see the covenantal bond they have with God and with other humans
as the source of communal solidarity to which they are summoned. Both Jews
and Christians are called to love their neighbors as they love themselves.87 Such
love will lead to the building up of the community and the solidarity needed to
sustain it. Catholicism synthesizes such biblical perspectives with Aristotle’s
more secular understanding of the social nature of the person, leading to a
relational understanding of dignity and rights that can be proposed as normative
in a pluralistic society.
This relational approach to the protection of human dignity is made quite
explicit in several normative affirmations of Catholic social thought. For
example, the U.S. Catholic bishops have insisted that the most basic form of
justice requires avoiding patterns of social interaction marked by inequality,
domination, and oppression.88 These patterns should be replaced by social
relations based on equality, reciprocity, and solidarity. Social relations marked
by these qualities will enable persons to participate actively in social life. Thus,
the U.S. bishops conclude that society and its members have an obligation to
ensure the possibility for participation by all members and that each member has
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a right to such participation. In the words of the U.S. bishops, basic justice
“demands the establishment of minimum levels of participation in the life of the
human community for all persons.”89
In this framework, injustice occurs and rights are denied when persons are
arbitrarily excluded from the participation in the social relationships they need
to live with dignity. The Catholic bishops go on to define human rights as “the
minimum conditions for life in community.”90 Human rights set the basic level
of social participation necessary to live in dignity. For the bishops, these minima
are required for the community life that the Bible sees arising from God’s
covenant with the people of Israel and the resulting covenant of the people with
each other. The bishops also see this participation as required by Aristotle’s
conviction that persons are essentially social animals. These basic levels of
social participation are due to people by right. Because human dignity can only
be realized and protected in solidarity with others, both dignity and human rights
are achieved in interactive relationships with others. Respect for human rights
and a strong sense of both personal and community responsibility are linked, not
opposed.
D. An Example: The Right to Participate and the End of Apartheid
This relational understanding of human rights sees both (1) civil and political
rights, and (2) social and economic rights as protections of different forms of
participation in the social interaction needed to live with dignity. We can
illustrate this through an example: the systematic violations of human rights in
South Africa during the apartheid regime. Under apartheid, black people and
those called colored (Asians and people seen as of “mixed race”) were denied
nearly all civil and political forms of participation in South African public life.
They could not vote, which denied their participation in the shaping of the
regime and the laws that governed them. They were prevented from assembling
as they wished and from communicating with each other through the press in
ways that would inform public opinion and shape public life. They were denied
the capacity to live out their religious and moral convictions when the regime
saw their participation in public life in accord with these convictions as a threat
to white supremacy.
Being denied even minimal levels of participation in the political dimensions
of public life subjected non-white people to truly harmful violations of their
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human dignity. These limits on the participation of people of color in South
African life were serious violations of their civil and political rights. Their
dignity was denied through their exclusion from social relationships based on
equality. Similarly, in the economic sphere, the exclusion of non-whites from
different spheres of South African economic life violated their dignity in harmful
ways. Under apartheid, whites in South Africa lived on an economic level
similar to that of well-off citizens in Europe and the United States. The severe
economic inequality of the country resulted in the deliberate exclusion of black
people and others of color from participation in the highly developed sectors of
the country’s economic life. White South Africans could participate in globally
linked finance, and thus grow in wealth. But those who were not white were
excluded from almost all education, including distinguished universities open to
whites.
Under apartheid, white South Africans were able to participate in a health
care system that was so advanced that it was able to carry out the first successful
heart transplant surgery, while people of color lacked the most basic forms of
primary care and frequently lacked basic public health resources like clean
drinking water and basic sanitation. These harms resulted from the denial of their
rights to participate in the social and economic life. This exclusion from essential
social relationships and forms of social participation denied sections of the
population the most basic requirements of their dignity as persons.
CONCLUSION: HUMAN RIGHTS AS GUARANTEES OF SOCIAL PARTICIPATION
There is high value in conceiving human rights as guarantees that people
will be able to participate in community life at the level required by their dignity
as persons. Viewing human rights from this relational, participatory perspective
shows why civil, political, social, and economic rights are essential. The
inclusion of all these rights in the UDHR was a significant achievement in 1948.
A relational, participation-based understanding of human rights sees rights as
norms that are neither individualist nor collectivist. Such an understanding can
make important contributions to the divisions that threaten the globe today. It
can challenge North Atlantic countries to recognize the importance of the
communal solidarity stressed in Asian and African cultures. It could also help
North Atlantic countries, especially the United States, recognize that economic
and cultural rights must be given more attention, both ethically and politically,
than these rights have often received. The countries of the Asian, African, and
Islamic world can also benefit from the relational interpretation of human rights
suggested here. Such an interpretation could help these countries recognize that
active political participation by all, if carried out appropriately, will contribute

HOLLENBACH_6.22.22

2022]

6/23/2022 12:34 PM

HUMAN DIGNITY IN SOCIAL SOLIDARITY

1507

to the communal solidarity they value in an inclusive way. It can help these
societies recognize that active participation by all can strengthen, rather than
threaten, social union. A relational, participation-based understanding of human
rights will help advance the human rights agenda in these countries in a way that
builds upon their traditional values rather than undermines them.
Much more can and should be said about the foundations and practical
implications of the relational understanding of rights sketched here. It is hoped
that the present sketch shows that we are not facing the twilight or endtimes of
human rights.91 Rather, the need for what Michael Perry calls a “global political
morality” means that the effort to carry forward the human rights project is
deeply important in today’s divided world.92 Strengthening human rights will
also strengthen the relationships needed to overcome the divisions of our
societies and our world.
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